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INTRODUCTION
In their Appellants' Brief, Edward L. Shinn and Donilee E. Shinn (hereinafter "Shinns"
or "Appellants") set forth legal and factual analyses arguing that the District Court was in error
when it dismissed their petition for judicial review on the basis of lack of prejudice to a
substantial right: first, that the Board's action interfered with the Shinns' property rights as
owners of the subject servient estate, and second, that the Board's action violated the Shinns' due
process rights. Additionally in said Appellants' Brief, the Appellants set forth legal and factual
analyses that the Board's action constituted reversible error for three reasons: first, due to
violations of applicable statutory provisions, second, due to the Board acting in excess of its
authority, and third, because the Board's action was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its
discretion.

Said errors constitute grounds to reverse the District Court ruling and remand this

matter to the Clearwater County Board of Commissioners for fhrther action.
Respondent concedes that Appellants have sufficiently shown prejudice to a substantial
right in order to establish standing, thus said issue is not in dispute. Respondent does dispute
Appellants' contention that reversible error had occurred. Said opposition is premised upon
Respondent's interpretation that the variance provision of the Local Land Use Planning Act,
Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code, specifically

I.e.

§ 67-6516, is not applicable in this instance;

that its interpretation of its local planning law is constrained only by an arbitrariness standard;
and that findings of fact made by the Planning and Zoning Commission are sufficient.
Appellants respectfully disagree with Respondent's analysis of the applicable law
concerning reversible error.

First, Appellants contend that the time limits placed on local

government do not require them to make determinations that should instead be properly raised in

an action for declaratory judgment or quiet title action in District Court; instead it is well within
Respondent's authority to condition the approval of variances to subdivision ordinances upon
judicial confirmation of the respective parties' rights under an easement. Second, Appellants
contend that Idaho Code Section 67-6516 is applicable in this instance because Respondent
explicitly adopted it, so it is inconsistent and arbitrary for Respondent now disclaim its
application on appeal.

Last, Appellants contend that bare, conclusory statements do not

constitute findings of fact that allow for meaningful review, thus are insufficient. This Reply
Brief will address each point in tum.

ARGUMENT
I.

REVERSAL IS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE THE BOARD'S ACTION
EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY.

In its Brief, Respondent argues against Appellants' position that the Board's action
improperly adjudicated the parties' rights under the easement, thereby exceeding its authority,
stating as follows:
When reviewing any subdivision application, a County must conduct a bare
review of the applicant's right to use an access road, whether private or public, to
ensure the ordinance requirements have been met. The application procedure
requires "proof of adequate access to a public street." Further, Clearwater County
must complete the hearing process within a specified time frame:
All Class A and Class B Subdivisions must have the hearing process completed
within six months of the first Planning and Zoning commission hearing date. All
other applications must have the hearing process completed within three months
of the first Planning and Zoning Commission hearing date.
This time requirement in the ordinance arises from a State mandate. I.e. 676521(c) provides:
After a hearing, the commission or governing board may:
(i) Grant or deny an application; or
(ii) Delay such a decision for a definite period of time for further study or
hearing. Each commission or governing board shall establish by ordinance or
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resolution a time period within which a recommendation or decision must be
made.
To adopt a ruling as requested by Appellants would mean that no County could
finalize the hearing process as ordinance and statute require, so long as any
interested party to the subdivision proceeding challenged the intent of the parties
to the access easement, no matter how spurious that challenge may be.
(Respondent's Brief at 10-11 (citations omitted, emphasis in original)).
The Respondent's analysis in this regard, as well as its narrow reading of the Jasso
decision, discussed infra, ignores the clear language of the statutory authority authorizing
subdivision ordinances.

I.C. § 67-6513.

Said statute clearly contemplates the conditional

approval of subdivision requests stating: "Denial of a subdivision pennit or approval of a

subdivision permit with conditions unacceptable to the landowner may be subject to the
regularly taking analysis provided for by section 67-8003, Idaho Code, consistent with the
requirements established thereby." Id.
The only reasonable reading ofIdaho Code Section 67-6513 is that a local zoning board
has the authority to grant a subdivision application subject to conditions. Where access to a
proposed subdivision is derived under an easement and the parties' respective rights under said
easement is contested, it is an excess of the local zoning board's authority to attempt to
adjudicate the easement's nature and scope. See Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho 790, 797,264
P.3d 897, 904 (2011) (citing Rural Kootenai Grg., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842,
993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999)).

Here, Respondent should have conditioned any approval upon

judicial confinnation of the applicant's rights under the subject easement.
Respondent argues that its limited review of the subject easement was necessary for
"administrative planning and zoning purposes," and suggest that Appellants have been in some
way remiss for not having pursued a quite title action in District Court. (Respondent's Brief at
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10-12 ("Appellants forward this argument while steadfastly refusing, even though being invited,
to file any quiet title action in District Court.")). This argument fails because it ignores the
respective postures and burdens of the involved parties. Appellants are not the moving party,
instead they are impacted neighbors. The Galloways, who have not participated in this appeal,
are the applicants and moving party. Appellants do not have the burden to demonstrate that the
applicant's rights under the subject easement allow access to the subdivision as proposed.
Appellants have merely exercised their due process rights to raise legitimate questions and
concerns about said subdivision application, and it is uncontested that they have standing to do
so. See supra. Appellants do not stand to benefit from the affinned approval of the subject
variances. Instead, applicants Ed Galloway and Carole Galloway are the persons who wish to
subdivide their land and have sought pennission to subdivide conditioned on the subject
variances from the County. Applicants Galloways bear the burden of proof in support of their
subdivision application, not the Appellants. Where Applicants Galloways have not secured an
affirn1ative decision as to their rights under the easement from the District Court, it is not within
the authority of the County to infer such rights by "engaging in a review of the access
easements," regardless of how neutral the County's attempts to conduct such a review may be.
Instead, the Idaho law on this point is very clear and well settled: a declaratory judgment
action in district court is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the respective rights of the parties
under the subject easement. Rural Kootenai Drg. Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842,
993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999).

Therefore, this Court's guidance from Jasso v. Camas County

remains applicable in this instance, despite having been found in dicta: "the Board may condition
approval of the subdivision approval upon a district court's entry of declaratory or final judgment
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that the easement provides the subdivision with the necessary access of a public road." 151
Idaho 790, 797,264 P.2d 897, 904 (2011).
Because Respondent exceeded its authority by adjudicating the parties' property rights
under the easement, the approval must be reversed and this matter remanded to the Board for
further action.

II.

REVERSAL IS JUSTIFIED DUE TO VIOLATIONS OF APPLICABLE
STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
A.

Respondent explicitly adopted Idaho Code Section 67-6516.

Respondent Clearwater County draws a distinction between zoning and subdivisions to
support its contention that Idaho Code Section 67-6516 applies only to zoning, not subdivisions.
(Respondent's Brief at 13-16).

To that end, Respondent argues that the Clearwater County

Subdivision Ordinance need not comply with the "characteristics of the site" language from said
statutory provision because such requirements apply only, in their view, to local zoning
ordinances, not subdivision ordinances. Id.
However, any distinction between a local zoning ordinance and subdivision ordinance as
applied here is merely an academic exercise because Clearwater County has explicitly adopted
the "undue hardship" requirement of Idaho Code Section 67-6516 and interpreting case law for
purposes of its analysis of the subject variances in this case. Specifically, the Decision that is the
subject of this appeal defined "undue hardship" as "some condition which is analyzed on a case
by case basis due to the characteristics of the site, or due to special circumstances or conditions,
which are peculiar to the property and not applicable generally to land or buildings in the
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neighborhood. (R., pp. 159 (citing to

I.e.

§ 67-5279 1; Blaha v. Board of Ada County Commr's,

134 Idaho 770, 9 P.3d 1236 (2000); Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 207 P.3d 998
(2009); Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 693 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1984)
(emphasis added)).
Because the Board of Clearwater County Commissioners explicitly relied upon Idaho
Code Section 67-6516 and interpreting case law, it is inconsistent and arbitrary for Respondent
to argue that the same case law, namely the decision of City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co.,
107 Idaho 906, 693 P.3d 1108 (Ct. App. 1984), is somehow now inapplicable in this Court's
consideration because said decision involved a zoning variance rather than a subdivision
variance.

The City of Burley case establishes that economic feasibility and expense versus

benefit arguments are of general applicability, not due to the "characteristics of the site," and
thus fail to substantiate a variance request. Likewise, here, the increased cost of compliance with
the subdivision ordinance does not warrant a variance due to "undue hardship."
For these reasons, Idaho Code Section 67-6516 is applicable in this particular instance,
and the Board's failure to comply with its requirements constitutes reversible error pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(a).

B.

Local agency is entitled to deference, but still constrained by more
than just arbitrariness in terms of defining "undue hardship."

In addition to arguing that its actions need not comply with Idaho Code Section 67-6516,
Respondent contends that "what constitutes an undue hardship depends on how the Planning and
Zoning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners interpret that term, rather than

I At footnote 16 of Respondent's Brief to the District Court and the associated text, Respondent quoted from this
excerpt of the Board's decision and admitted that its reference to I.e. §67-5279 was in error and should have been to
I.C. §67-6516. (R., p. 562).
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how Courts interpret that term, and so long as the County's decision is not arbitrary, it cannot be
reversed on these grounds." (Respondent's Brief at 16).
Appellants respectfully disagree with Respondent's reading of the applicable law and
contend that local zoning authorities must conform to judicial interpretation of "undue hardship"
in the interest of fairness and reasonableness.

However, in this instance, it is not the

Respondent's outright dismissal of relevant case law discussing "undue hardship" that makes its
action arbitrary. Instead it is its selective cherry-picking of when said cases apply (in their
written decision upholding of the variance), and when said cases do not apply (in this appeal),
that makes its action arbitrary.
As discussed above, Respondent's position and analysis concerning "undue hardship" is
arbitrary in that the language relied upon by the Respondent from its own opinion contradicts the
position it now takes. (R., p. 159; Respondent's Brief at 17). In interpreting its own ordinance,
the Board discussed the "undue hardship" requirement as follows:
Undue hardship is some condition which is analyzed on a case by case basis due
to characteristics of the site, or due to special circumstances or conditions, which
are peculiar to the property and not applicable generally to land or buildings in the
neighborhood, and which is not in conflict with the public interest.
(R., p. 159) (citing I.e. 67-5279 2 ; Wohrle v. Kootenai Cnty., 147 Idaho 267, 273-74, 207 P.3d
998, 1004-05 (2009); Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693 P.2d 1108, 111
(Ct.App. 1984)).
Respondent now argues that "undue hardship" need have no relation of any kind to the
"characteristics of the site" or due to "special circumstances or conditions, which are peculiar to

2 At footnote 16 of Respondent's Brief to the District Court and the associated text, Respondent quoted from this
excerpt of the Board's decision and admitted that its reference to I.e. §67-5279 was in error and should have been to
I.e. §67-6516. (R., p. 562).
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the property and not applicable generally to land or buildings in the neighborhood," which is a
complete contradiction to its reasoning in the decision on appeal. (R., p. 159).
Respondent further argues that the City of Burley decision is inapplicable because it
concemed a zoning ordinance rather than a subdivision ordinance. (See Respondent's Brief at
19-20).

This distinction is also arbitrary where Respondent specifically adopted the

requirements of the variance statute in considering whether to uphold the variances. See supra §
Il(A).

Respondent further argues that Appellants "failed to raise the issue of undue hardship at
the Planning and Zoning level." (Respondent's Brief at 22). This recollection is mistaken.
Appellants note that the Board of County Commissioners specifically remanded the application
back to the Planning and Zoning Commission with the request that the Commission consider
whether there were "special circumstances or conditions affecting the property ... such that
failure to grant a variance would cause an undue hardship to the developer[.)" (R., pp. 169-70).
The record reflects that at said second Planning and Zoning Commission public hearing, counsel
for Appellants clearly testified, in part, as follows:
MR. JONES: ... I'm going to try very hard to address only the hardship issues
that are here tonight. ... We're talking, is there something particular about this
piece of property that makes it so that you cannot put -- you cannot comply with
the requirements of your subdivision ordinance, which requires, as you'll recall, a
60-foot right-of-way and a 24-foot road. '" This is property that's gently rolling
and very capable of putting a road at virtually any place. It's very, I mean, it's
pretty dam level ground .... Well, I think it's undue hardship because if you
have a piece of property that is very steep and you can't build a road -- in
other words, you've got to have a narrower road because you simply can't
build it, but this is just plain flat ground. There's no undue hardship in
building a road across this property. I think it's very relevant as to whether or
not this is an undue hardship in building it.
(R., p. 348, 351, 353-54) (emphasis added).
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Clearly, as the above passage illustrates, Appellants raised and preserved the "undue
hardship" issue for appeal.
To the extent that Respondent inadvertently misstated its position m its brief to this
Court, Appellants note that Respondent argued to the District Court that only the undue hardship
issue had been preserved for appeal, stating:
At oral argument in front of the Board of County Commissioners, Petitioners
specifically limited their appeal to the issue of "undue hardship," thereby
removing from consideration any claim that the P&Z Commission failed to
consider the element of "injurious to other property in the area." The result is that
the issue was not raised on appeal to the Board of County Commissioners, an
administrative remedy required by Clearwater County Ordinance.
(R., p. 570).
The record reflects that all issues raised by Appellants in its appeal to this Court are
preserved for appeal: the summarized letter dated March 25, 2011 and submitted in support of
Appellants' Application for Appeal clearly states in relevant part: "Grounds for appeal. No facts
or testimony were presented which would authorize the issuances of a variance under the terms
and conditions of the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance."

(R., p. 29).

Said

"summarized letter" appropriately defined the scope of Appellants' appeal.
Respondent further argues that "[a]t no time did the Board identify a self-inflicted
hardship as being a factor to be considered in the context of the Clearwater County subdivision
ordinances." (Respondent's Brief at 22). Again, Respondent's recollection is mistaken as the
record reflects that the Board's decision of November 21, 2011, discussed the self-inflicted
nature of an undue hardship as follows:

Dawson and those cases cited therein go on to described that self inflicted
hardship, if it exists, is a factor to be considered in whether or not to grant or deny
a variance, but is not controlling. Therefore, this Board of Commissioners cannot
say that the Planning and Zoning Commission abused its discretion when
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deciding to grant the variances in spite of the argument of self inflicted hardship
and finds in favor of Galloway on this issue.
(R., p. 173). Presumably, it is now Respondent's position that it is not bound by case law in

interpreting its own ordinance, but Appellants contend that said view is misplaced, particularly
where the subject decision cites to and quotes at length from an opinion of this Court. It is
arbitrary and unreasonable for Respondent to rely heavily on a case in support of affinning the
grant of the variances and then argue that said case is inapplicable on appeal.
For these reasons, the decision of the Board of Commissioners to uphold the subject
variances should be reversed pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)( d) on the basis that said
action was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion.

c.

Findings of fact cannot consist merely of conclusory statements.

The Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance establishes that:
No variance, as herein defined, shall be favorably acted by upon by the
Commission unless there is a finding, as a result of public hearing that ALL of the
following exist:
a.
That there are such special circumstances or conditions affecting the
property that the strict application of the provisions of this Ordinance would
clearly be impracticable or unreasonable and cause an undue hardship.
b.
That strict compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance would
result in extraordinary topography, or such other conditions would result in
inhibiting the achievement of the objectives of the Ordinance.
c.
That the granting of the specified variance will not be detrimental to the
public welfare or injurious to other property in the area in which the property is
situated.
d.
That such variance will not violate the provisions of the Idaho Code.
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance (hereinafter "CCSO") at Art. VIII(B).
Appellants contend that no specific finding was made to support the requisite conclusion
that "granting of the specified variance will not be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious
to other property in the area in which the property is situated." (See Appellants' Brief at 23-24).

10

In its Brief, Respondent argues that the following excerpts from the relevant Planning and
Zoning Commission decisions, along with the findings contained within the second decision
more generally, constitute sufficient findings of fact:
The public welfare is not impacted at all since the changes will not have an
impact on emergency vehicles. Nor will it impact other owners in the area as the
design and implementation is entirely within the parameters of the deeded RlW
[right of way] and the original (approved) plat. Carole and I are doing this low
density sub with applicable CC&Rs to limit impact on the neighbors both visually
and physically.
The purpose of the subdivision ordinances in general are set forth in Article I,
Section C of the Subdivision Ordinance and is not re-printed here. The
Commission finds strict compliance with the requirements of the ordinance do
inhibit the achievement of the objectives as stated, including orderly development,
given the unique circumstances of the subject property. Alternatively, the
variances being granted do not impede or be detrimental to the public welfare, or
injurious to the public welfare or be injurious to other property in the area, will
not violate the provisions of Idaho Code, nor will nullifY the interest and purpose
of the Ordinance or Comprehensive Plan.
(Respondent's Brief at 22-23 (quoting R., pp. 137, 146».
Appellants note that the first paragraph of said excerpt originated from an email received
from applicant Galloway prior to the first public hearing on his and his wife's variance
application. (R., p. 137). For purposes of this appeal, Appellants concedes that said statement
satisfies the requisite finding that the proposed subdivision and subject variances will not be
detrimental to the public welfare (generally) on the basis that it addresses potential concems
about access by emergency vehicles and impact on owners in the general area. Id. However, a
close review reflects that it does not satisfY the requisite prong that the variance not be "injurious
to other property in area in which the property is situated." C.C.S.O. at Art. VlII(B)(c).
First, applicant Galloway asserted, and the Planning and Zoning Commission adopted
from his email verbatim, that the variances "will not impact other owners in the area as the

11

design and implementation is entirely within parameters of the deeded RlW [right of way] and
the original (approved plat)." (R., p. 137). Said passage speaks to owners other than those who
have rights "within the parameters of the deeded [easement]," but does not address the impact
upon owners in the area who retain rights within said parameters.

Said owners include

Appellants and Don Ingle, both of whom testified in opposition to said variances at the March
21,2011 and August 15,2011 public hearings before the Planning and Zoning Commission. (R.,
pp. 335, 232-55, 342-62). There is no dispute that Appellants are owners of propeliy in the area
as they own the property immediately adjacent to the proposed subdivision and the land that the
proposed access road crosses in order to access the nearest county road.

(R., 67-75, 335).

Appellants, as owners of the servient estate, retain property rights that are potentially injured by
the subject variances and Board's action. Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnt. Bd. of Comm'rs, 151
Idaho 228,223,254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011); see Appellants Brief at 9-12. Because said finding
of fact does not speak to whether the proposed variances would be injurious to the Appellants'
propeliy, it is insufficient to support the requisite finding that "the granting of the specified
variance will not be ... injurious to other property in the area in which the property is situated."
C.C.S.O. at Art. VIII(B)(c).
Second, applicant Galloway asserted, and the Planning and Zoning Commission adopted
from his email verbatim, that there would be "applicable CC&Rs to limit impact on the
neighbors both visually and physically." (R., p. 137). The clear language of this statement
reflects that there will be some visual and physical impact on the neighbors, albeit limited. Id. A
review of the Planning and Zoning Commission decisions finds no further finding of fact that
discusses the extent or nature of said impact or what provisions the proposed CC&Rs will
contain to alleviate said impact that support the conclusion that the admitted impact would not
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rise to the level of "injurious to other property in the area in which the property is situated."
c.C.S.O. at Art. VIII(B)(c). (R., pp. 135-46).
F or these reasons, the first paragraph of the excerpt relied upon by Respondent fails to
demonstrate that the Planning and Zoning Commission made findings of fact to support its
conclusion that the subject variances would not be "injurious to other property in the area in
which the property is situated." C.C.S.O. at Art. VIII(B)( c).
The second paragraph of the excerpt relied upon by Respondent consists entirely of
conclusory statements reciting the standard to be applied by the Planning and Zoning
Commission. (R., p. 146). Such a finding of fact is clearly inadequate because it denies this
Court the opportunity to review the Commission's decision-making process for an abuse of
discretion, and instead creates a situation where this reviewing Court must substitute its
judgment for that of the agency in contradiction of Idaho Code Section 67-5279(1).

See

Woodfield v. Bd. of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 744, 905 P.2d 1047, 1053 (Ct. App.
1995).
Last, Appellants respectfully disagree with Respondent's characterization that the
"Findings of Fact" contained in the second Planning and Zoning Decision "detailed its evidence
and findings, most of which is applicable to a finding that neighboring properties will not be
injured." (Respondent's Brief at 23). (See R., pp. 142-46). Said discussion does not relate to
the potential injury to other property owners in the area. !d. Instead, said findings discuss the
procedural history of the application (see

~~

1-3); the terms of the subject easement (see

~~4

and

6); the practical and economic arguments related to the subject variances (for and against) (see
5 and 7), whether an "undue burden" had been shown (see
circumstances exist (see

~

~~

~

8 and 10); whether special

9);. (R., pp. 144-46). The only discussion of whether the variances
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would be injurious to other property in the area is the condusory statement relied upon by
Respondent and discussed above. (R., p. 146, ~ ll(a».
For these reasons, the Board's approval of said variances where there are no findings of
fact beyond condusory statements that the variances would not be "injurious to other property in
the area in which the property is situated" must be reversed pursuant to Idaho Code Section 675279(3)( a).
CONCLUSION

There remams no dispute that Appellants have sufficiently established that their
substantial rights have been prejudiced, thereby satisfying the requirements of Idaho Code
Section 67-5279(4). Therefore, the remaining issue before this Court is whether one of the
reversible errors under Idaho Code Section 67-5279(2) is found: that Respondent's approval of
the subject variances violated statutory provisions; was made in excess of the County's statutory
authority; or was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion. For the reasons discussed
above and Appellants' Brief, Respondent's approval of said variances did exceed its authority,
did violate applicable statutes, and was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the County's grant of the subject variances and
remand this action to the Board of County Commissioners for further action.
DATED this

day of May, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
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